

Def Doc No 1401 (ERRATA SHEET)

正 誤 表

農ニ配布済ノ辯護側等第一四〇一號（外務省在米大使館間日米交渉關係往復電報）日本語審議中正ノ誤ヲ御訂正下サイ。

(誤)

(正)

一四〇一―B―
四頁一行目

海軍關係

海運關係

一四〇一―C―
一頁十四行目

算 近

般^〇 近

一四〇一―E―
六行目

緩和スルコトヒ

緩和スルコトモ

一四〇一—F—

二頁六行目

且我方ノ壓迫下ニ

且我方カ米ノ壓迫下ニ

一四〇一—G—

二頁一二行目

一十三行目

原因除去ノ爲メ
(以下二十三字不明瞭)
合衆國ヲ含ム一切ノ國ト
同等ノ待

原因除去ノ爲メ合衆國ノ必要
トスル天然資源ノ生産及獲得
ニ協力ス

一四〇一—J—

二頁二行目

此ノ(脱)ハ
字

此ノ悞ハ

一四〇一—M—

二頁二行目

望ミマス

望マス

一四〇一—R—

二頁五行目

困難(二)ノ理由モアリ

困難(二)ノ理由モアリ

二頁九行目

行ハレタル日支和平後ノ

二頁十四行目

撤兵スル用意

行ハレタル後ノ今日軍事の見
地ヨリ見たル日支和平後ノ

撤兵スルノ用意

一四〇一―T一

二頁六行目

屈

屈

二頁一二行目

日米關係復雜

日米關係ハ復雜

二頁一二行目

シ得サルヘキ

シ得サルヘク

四頁二行目

之レニ米側ノ

之レ更ニ米國側ノ

一四〇一―U一

一頁一二行目

又獨逸ノ宣傳ノ如ク

又獨逸東方戰果ハ獨逸
逸ノ宣傳ノ如ク

三頁四行目

第六六二號

第六二二號

三頁七行目

ヤト思ハルノ次ニ下
記文章脱落(新章)

讀ニ重大ナル問題ナルカ要スル
ニ此點日米了解ノ根本ナリト認

一四〇一―Ⅴ―

三行目

三十八日

二十八日

一四〇一―Ⅳ―

四行目
五行目

内閣ニ於テ
駐兵撤兵予定ノ方針
ニ從ヒ

閣内ニ於テ
駐兵撤兵問題カ其ノ重點ナルモ
今後如何ナル閣ヲ成立スルニ
セヨ予定ノ方針ニ從ヒ

4

一四〇一―Ⅲ―

八行目
同 右

乃而
若杉ヲシテハ

仍而
若杉ヲシテ我方トシテハ

一四〇一―Ⅱ―
一頁最終行

係ル

係ハル

ノラルルヲ以テ更ニ御検討相成
像致シ度シ。
尚 〇〇〇〇〇〇〇

一四〇一〇二	二頁三行目	「我方トシテハ」 ノ次ニ記「節脱落」	我方トシテハ獨ニ四トシ テ當於ニシテ
一四〇一〇二	一〇行目	之ニ對シテ	之ニ對シテ
一四〇一〇二	一頁八行目	提案ヲ	右提案ヲ
一四〇一〇二	一頁二行目	第一二〇號	第一二〇四號
一四〇一〇二	一頁一三行目	曆史	曆史
一四〇一〇二	三行目	各便	各紙
一四〇一〇二	三頁三行目	讀上ケタル自分ハ	讀上ケタル上。自分ハ

Def. Doc. No. 1401-A-1 -- J-3

CERTIFICATE

I, Urabe Katsuma, Acting Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the following defense documents are true and correct copies of official documents under the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

- 1401-A-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Konoye, 17 April 1941. No. 233
- 1401-B-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Konoye, 18 April 1941. No. 239
- 1401-C-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Matsuoka, 8 May 1941. No. 277
- 1401-D-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 24 July 1941. No. 566
- 1401-E-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 4 August 1941. No. 646
- 1401-F-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 5 August 1941. No. 447
- 1401-G-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 5 August 1941. No. 448
- 1401-H-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 6 August 1941. No. 659
- 1401-J-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 7 August 1941. No. 452
- 1401-K-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 18 August 1941. No. 709
- 1401-M-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 29 August 1941. No. 756
- 1401-N-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 3 September 1941. No. 778
- 1401-O-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 4 September 1941. No. 528
- 1401-P-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 8 September 1941. No. 791
- 1401-Q-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 22 September 1941. No. 589
- 1401-R-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 23 September 1941. No. 591
- 1401-S-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 27 September 1941. No. 604
- 1401-T-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 27 September 1941. No. 605
- 1401-U-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 3 October 1941. No. 894

Def. Doc. No. 1401-A-1 -- J-3

1401-V-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura,
3 October 1941. No. 627

1401-W-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura,
17 October, 1941. No. 682

1401-Y-1 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
21 October 1941. No. 698

1401-Z-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
24 October 1941. No. 995

1401-A-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
4 November 1941. No. 725

1401-B-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
4 November 1941. No. 726

1401-C-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
4 November 1941. No. 731

1401-D-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
5 November 1941. No. 735

1401-E-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
6 November 1941. No. 739

1401-F-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
7 November 1941. No. 1055

1401-G-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
9 November 1941. No. 751

1401-H-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
10 November 1941. No. 1066

1401-J-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
10 November 1941. No. 754

1401-K-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
10 November 1941. No. 755

1401-L-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
13 November 1941. No. 1087

1401-N-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
14 November 1941. No. 1090

1401-O-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
16 November 1941. No. 782

1401-P-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
7 November 1941. No. 783

1401-Q-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
17 November 1941. No. 1118

1401-R-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
21 November 1941. No. 1147

1401-S-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
23 November 1941. No. 1160

1401-T-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
23 November 1941. No. 1161

Def. Doc. No. 1401-A-1 -- J-3

- 1401-U-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
23 November 1941. No. 816
- 1401-V-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
25 November 1941. No. 1179
- 1401-W-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
26 November 1941. No. 833
- 1401-X-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
27 November 1941. No. 1190
- 1401-Y-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
27 November 1941. No. 1204
- 1401-A-3 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
28 November 1941. No. 1214
- 1401-B-3 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
30 November 1941. No. 1222
- 1401-C-3 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
1 December 1941. No. 866
- 1401-D-3 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
3 December 1941. No. 878
- 1401-E-3 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
6 December 1941. No. 1275
- 1401-F-3 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
7 December 1941. No. 905
- 1401-G-3 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura,
3 November 1941. No. 723
- 1401-H-3 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura,
28 August 1941. No. 509
- 1401-I-3 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
23 November 1941. No. 1189
- 1401-J-3 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō,
16 November 1941. No. 1106
- 1401-I-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura,
3 October 1941. No. 628

Certified at Tokyo
on this 12th day of August 1941

/s/ Urabe Katsuma (seal)

Witness: /s/ Sato Takegoro (seal)

Def Doc No 1401 (A-1 to J-3)

一 四 〇 一 一 G 一	一 四 〇 一 一 F 一	一 四 〇 一 一 E 一	一 四 〇 一 一 D 一	一 四 〇 一 一 C 一	一 四 〇 一 一 B 一	一 四 〇 一 一 A 一
---------------------------------	---------------------------------	---------------------------------	---------------------------------	---------------------------------	---------------------------------	---------------------------------

野村大使發近衛大臣宛電報
 一九四一年四月十七日、第二三三號
 野村大使發近衛大臣宛電報
 一九四一年四月十八日第二三九號
 野村大使發松岡大臣宛電報
 一九四一年五月八日 第二七七號
 野村大使發豐田大臣宛電報
 一九四一年七月二十四日 第五六六號
 野村大使發豐田大臣宛電報
 一九四一年八月四日 第六四六號
 豐田大臣發野村大使宛電報
 一九四一年八月五日 第四四七號
 豐田大臣發野村大使宛電報
 一九四一年八月五日 第四四八號

Def Doc No 1401

一四〇一B一
一四〇一S一
一四〇一K一
一四〇一M一
一四〇一N一
一四〇一O一
一四〇一P一

野村大使發豐田大臣宛電報
一九四一年八月六日 第六五九號
豐田大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年八月七日 第四五二號
野村大使發豐田大臣宛電報
一九四一年八月十八日 第七〇九號
野村大使發豐田大臣宛電報
一九四一年八月二十九日 第七五六號
野村大使發豐田大臣宛電報
一九四一年九月三日 第七七八號
豐田大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年九月四日 第五二八號
野村大使發豐田大臣宛電報
一九四一年九月八日 第七九一號

Def Doc No 1401

一四〇一—q—

一四〇一—r—

一四〇一—s—

一四〇一—t—

一四〇一—u—

一四〇一—v—

一四〇一—w—

豐田大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年九月二十二日 第五八九號

豐田大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年九月二十三日 第五九一號

豐田大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年九月二十七日 第六〇四號

豐田大使發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年九月二十七日 第六〇五號

野村大使發豐田大臣宛電報

一九四一年十月三日 第八九四號

豐田大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年十月三日 第六二七號

豐田大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年十月十七日 第六八二號

Def Doc No 1401

一四〇一Y一

一四〇一Z一

一四〇一A二

一四〇一B二

一四〇一C二

一四〇一D二

一四〇一E二

東郷大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年十月二十一日 第六九八號

野村大使發東郷大臣宛電報

一九四一年十月二十四日 第九九五號

東郷大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年十一月四日 第七二五號

東郷大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年十一月四日 第七二六號

東郷大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年十一月四日 第七三一號

東郷大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年十一月五日 第七三五號

東郷大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年十一月六日 第七三九號

一四〇一一F二
一四〇一一E二
一四〇一一D二
一四〇一一C二
一四〇一一B二
一四〇一一A二
一四〇一一N二

野村大使發東鄉大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月七日 第一〇五五號
東鄉大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年十一月九日 第七五一號
野村大使發東鄉大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月十日 第一〇六六號
東鄉大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年十一月十日 第七五四號
東鄉大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年十一月十日 第七五五號
野村大使發東鄉大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月十三日 第一〇八七號
野村大使發東鄉大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月十四日 第一〇九〇號

一四〇一一〇二
一四〇一一P二
一四〇一一Q二
一四〇一一R二
一四〇一一S二
一四〇一一T二
一四〇一一U二

東郷大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年十一月十六日 第七八二號
東郷大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年十一月七日 第七八三號
野村大使發東郷大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月十七日 第一一八號
野村大使發東郷大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月二十一日 第一一四七號
野村大使發東郷大臣宛電報
一九四一年十二月三日 第一一六〇號
野村大使發東郷大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月二十三日 第一一六一號
東郷大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年十一月二十三日 第八一六號

一四〇一—V二
一四〇一—W二
一四〇一—X二
一四〇一—Y二
一四〇一—A三
一四〇一—B三
一四〇一—C三

野村大使發東鄉大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月二十五日 第一一七九號
東鄉大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年十一月二十六日 第八三三號
野村大使發東鄉大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月二十七日 第一一九〇號
野村大使發東鄉大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月二十七日 第一二〇四號
野村大使發東鄉大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月二十八日 第一二一四號
野村大使發東鄉大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月三十日 第一二二二號
東鄉大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年十二月一日 第八六六號

Def Doc No 1401

一四〇一—D三
一四〇一—E三
一四〇一—F三
一四〇一—G三
一四〇一—H三
一四〇一—I三
一四〇一—J三

東郷大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年十二月三日 第八七八號
野村大使發東郷大臣宛電報
一九四一年十二月六日 第一二七五號
東郷大臣宛電報使宛電報
一九四一年十二月七日 第九〇五號
東郷大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年十二月三日 第七二三號
豐田大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年八月二十八日 第五〇九號
野村大使發東郷大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月二十三日 第一一八九號
野村大使發東郷大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月十六日 第一一〇六號

一四〇一一一

豐田大臣發野村大使宛電報
一九四一年十月三日 第六二八號

昭和二十二年八月十二日

於東京

浦 部 勝 馬

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同 日 同 所

立會人 佐 藤 武 五 郎

文書ノ出所並ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

自分、浦部勝馬ハ外務省文書課長代理ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル下記題名ノ辯護側文書ハ日本政府外務省ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス。

From Toyoda to Nomura
3 October 1941
No. 628

(1) The resignation of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka has brightened the prospect that Japan may give up its Axis policy in favor of a more moderate one.

(2) The difficulties in the Japanese-American negotiations lie, it is observed, in that whereas Japan requires prompt settlement of the matter and cannot afford for the present to go beyond a general understanding, the United States is adopting a policy of procrastination and cautiously examining every word and phrase to be used in any agreement between the two countries. Such attitude of the United States comes from the lack of her understanding of the mind of the Japanese people as well as the tense internal situation in Japan which does not admit of further delay. It would be very regrettable if this most favorable chance for a solution of the Far Eastern problems which we have had since my assuming the present post were thus lost.

(3) Prince Konoe has a sincere desire of saving Japan from the crisis which she would face because of her participation in the Triple Alliance and her relations with the Axis, for which he is responsible. But there is within this country rather strong feeling against his change of policy, so that it is feared that he may lose his supporters if there be no prospect of success in the Japanese-American negotiations. Moreover, the Konoe Cabinet will come to a crisis if the negotiations prove abortive or are unduly protracted.

(4) It is an opinion common to the American Ambassador in Tokyo and myself that although there is much difficulty in the present negotiations, merely to cling to the present prudent attitude and to lose the present favorable chance is an extremely ill-advised policy. It goes without saying that the measures of economic reprisal should not be alleviated until we see convincing proof of a change in Japan's foreign policy--or in other words, sure signs of the realization of the Konoe principles.

辯護側文書一四〇一―I―一號

皇田發野村宛一九四一年十月三日第六二八號

一、松岡前外相ノ辭職ニ依リ樞軸政策ヨリ穩健政策ヘノ轉換ノ見込ミ増大
セリ

二、日米會談ノ離隔ハ日本側ニ於テハ緊急ヲ要シ且現在ノ處一般的理解以
上ニ出テ得サルニ對シ米側ハ遲延策ヲ講シ且國交調整ノ如何ナル取
極ニ付テモ先ツ一字一句ヲ忽ヒニヒサラントシ居ルカ如ク認メラルル
處右ハ日本國民ノ心理乃至ハ遲延ヲ許ササル日本ノ國內情勢ヲ理解シ
居ラサルニ基クモノト認メラル新テ極東問題解決ニ付本便著任以來ノ
最モ好キ機會ヲ逸シ去ルコトアラハ遺憾ナリ

三、近衛公ハ自ラ責任ヲ有ヒラルル三國同盟及樞軸關係ノ爲日本カ直面ス
ヘキ危險防止ニ眞摯ナル希望ヲ有ヒラルルモ公ノ政策轉換ニ對スル國
内ノ反對ハ相當強ク遠カニ日米會談進捗ノ兆ヲ見サレハ國交調整ニ關
スル支持者ヲ失フニ至ルヘク又萬一本會談カ流産ニ終ルカ又ハ不當ニ

四、長引ク場合近衛内閣ハ危機ニ陥ルヘシ

本件交渉ニ幾多難問アルモ徒ラニ嘗試的態度ヲ採リ現在ノ好機ヲ逸スルハ在日米大使及本使ハ共ニ忍メテ原案ナリトノ意見ナリ
尙日本ノ外交政策轉換ノ確證決言スレハ近衛原則實現ノ徵ヲ見ル迄ハ
對日經濟報復措置ヲ緩和スヘキニ非サルコト勿論ナリ。

From Nomura to T5g5
14 November 1941
No. 1090

I submit this telegram for your reference only.

With respect to the Japanese-American negotiations, I will, believing in success, do all that I can until the last moment. Beyond that, my state of mind is to do my best and leave the rest to providence. However, I observe the present situation as follows:

1. As I have repeatedly made report to you, the Pacific policy of the United States is to stop further advance of Japan either to north or to south. This objective she desires to achieve through economic pressure, but preparations for war are steadily in progress.
2. In order to meet the southern or northern advance of Japan, operational and all other preparations are being made and the utmost cooperation is being carried on with the countries concerned. It is the determination of the United States rather to wage war than to concede anything from fundamental political principles she holds traditionally, or to compromise, and it seems that she has no intention what ever of repeating what happened in Munich, which is now branded as a failure. This is the more true by reason of encouragement at the observation that the peak of German power has now been passed, that the Soviet Union maintains its fighting spirit, and that the danger of a separate peace has decreased.
3. With respect to China, ties of alliance become stronger and stronger. The United States gives all possible assistance to China, and will accept nothing which will prejudice the sovereignty of China, even in favor of stabilization of the Pacific. It is, therefore, possible that the China problem may become the "stumbling-block" of the stabilization of the Pacific, thereby bringing the adjustment of Japanese-American relations to end in failure.
4. Our relations with the Axis are very flexible; they can be very close or otherwise depending on the policy of the Japanese Government. The United States, however, believes that Japan is in a position in which she can stab the United States in the back if the situation warrants. The press tends to report on the intimacy of Japan with the Axis, and some papers even go so far as to talk about their unity.
5. In case Japan dares to advance into the south for the sake of her life and self-existence, it is very likely that a war against Britain, the United States and the Netherlands will follow as a consequence, and that the Soviet Union, too, will join it. In such case, Central American countries, among the neutrals, are at the disposal of the United States, and the South American countries will, though reluctantly, maintain neutrality in favor of the United States, it being necessary economically for them to do so.
6. Such a war will necessarily be a long war, in which the winning or losing of local battles will not matter much. It is easy to see that the victor will be the one who holds out till the last.

7. The United States is getting entangled in the Atlantic step by step, but up to now she has not gone beyond the convoy operations, so she can concentrate her main forces in the Pacific at any time. Britain, too can, in view of the present state of the German and Italian navies, spare a considerable part of her forces for the Indian Ocean. It has been my expectation that the United States would more or less compromise in the Pacific when she got very busy in the Atlantic, but no such signs have yet been observed. On the contrary, it is necessary to bear in mind the possibility that the United States will first join the war in the Pacific, because public opinion still holds against war with Germany, while there is less opposition to a Pacific war.

8. Although I am not very familiar with the present domestic situation in Japan, I learn through your instructions that the situation is pressing and that the endurance of the Japanese people is reaching its maximum. It may be presumptuous for me to suggest it in such circumstances, but I consider it advisable to be patient and wait for a month or two, if the domestic situation permits, until we get a clearer over-all prospect of the world war.

Please read my telegrams No. 894 and 901 of 3 and 1 October.

1/2

Def Doc No. 1401 N-2

[illegible]

や米國ハ一步、一步太西洋ニ深入シツツアルカ如キモ該方面ハ要スルニ
「コンボイ」ニ關聯スル作戰ニ止マリ今日ノ形勢ニテハ何日ニテモ主
カワ太平洋ニ集中シ得ヘク英國モ亦獨伊海軍ノ現狀ニ照ラシ可成リノ
點カワ印度洋方面ニ差向ケ得ルニ相違ナク本使ハ元來米國カ太西洋ニ
仕懸セラルルニ至ラハ太平洋ニ於テ多少妥協氣分トナルヘシト豫期シ
タリシカ其ノ氣分ハ今ノ所少シモ現レサル次第ナリ寧ロ米政府ハ國內
問題ヨリシテ對獨戰爭ニ對シテハ今猶若干ノ異論アルニ對シ今日ニテ
ハ太平洋戰ニ與論ノ反對少キニ觀テ此ノ方面ヨリ參戰スルコトモ充分
アリ得ヘシト見込ミ置クヲ要ス

八我國現下ノ國情ヲ詳知セサルモ果次ノ貴電ニ依リ形勢ノ急迫ヲ知り國
民亦堪忍袋ヲ切リツツアル趣ヲ承知スルニ拘ラス斯カルコトヲ申上クルハ
ルハ聊カ亂暴ノ誹ヲ弭レサルモ本使ハ國情許スナラハ一、二ヶ月ノ間ニ於
テ爭フヨリモ今少シ世界戰ノ全局ニ於テ前途ノ見透シ判明スル時迄辛
勞スルコト得策ナリト認考ス

尙十月三日及四日ノ拙電第八九四號及第九〇一號第一讀ヲ讀フ

一、二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、二十二、二十三、二十四、二十五、二十六、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十二、三十三、三十四、三十五、三十六、三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十一、四十二、四十三、四十四、四十五、四十六、四十七、四十八、四十九、五十、五十一、五十二、五十三、五十四、五十五、五十六、五十七、五十八、五十九、六十、六十一、六十二、六十三、六十四、六十五、六十六、六十七、六十八、六十九、七十、七十一、七十二、七十三、七十四、七十五、七十六、七十七、七十八、七十九、八十、八十一、八十二、八十三、八十四、八十五、八十六、八十七、八十八、八十九、九十、九十一、九十二、九十三、九十四、九十五、九十六、九十七、九十八、九十九、一百。

又、今日の世に於ては、
一、政治の腐敗
二、経済の不振
三、教育の荒廃
四、文化の衰退
五、社会の不安定
六、国民の貧乏
七、国家の弱体化
八、国際的地位の低下
九、民族意識の淡薄
十、宗教心の喪失

[illegible]

「衣襟思ひやりとて、口も承け、生み給ふに、道なきに、いまだ、白土の、

八、口、野、下、ノ、國、計、又、精、略、也、サ、ル、事、果、大、ノ、賞、罰、ニ、對、シ、速、報、ノ、急、後、ヲ、賦、リ、國、

てり掛へゝ小風盛る鶴もそ夏木

八太平樂舞三與俗人共也中二曰文舞八宮面曰舞之樂不與俗人共也

同四百里ノ支役候御尋ニ付テハ今條若干ノ異相アリテ三箇ノ令目ニ付テ

ミリハ成其ノ爲食ハ今ノ世少ク亦思ハセシ大積セリ寧日米類賣ハ口内

太平清品

六、改定明和曆式曰、三差由や橋より三時、改定や、本國八元米、米國六元、

代々太平樂を奏中へ、舞臺子亦隨音聲、與舞臺樂々、而舞也、

「ソノ活ノ」ニ因テスル特種ニ由リ今已ニ紙巻ニ入ル所日ニ至リ

[illegible]

Def. Doc. No. 1401-Y-2

From Nomura to Tōgō
27 November 1941
No. 1204

Reference to your telegram No. 842.

The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands Government on account of her insistence and because of our request that she do so. It was disclosed on the 24th by the White House that the United States had carried out the protective occupation of Dutch Guiana after having reached an agreement with the Dutch Government in Britain. It was clearly stated in the announcement that the primary objective of the occupation was to secure aluminum, which is vital to American defence; that the American army is employed for the occupation because the Dutch Government is unable to dispatch its troops from the Netherlands East Indies in the circumstances prevailing in the Southwestern Pacific; and that Brazil takes part in the occupation by invitation of the Dutch Government. Moreover, after the Dutch Foreign Minister conferred with the American authorities on his way to the Netherlands East Indies, the supply of American munitions thereto was increased, and technicians are coming and going between the two. These circumstances, together with the past history of the Netherlands East Indies, indicate the possibility of an American and British occupation of the Indies, depending upon the situation following rupture of the Japanese-American negotiations, for the purpose of securing such vital materials as rubber and tin, in the same manner as the American and Brazilian occupation of Dutch Guiana. Such circumstances must be borne in mind, and the reference in my telegram No. 1180 is in the same vein.

辯護側書證第一四〇一五二號

野村發東郷宛一九四一年十一月二十七日第一二〇號

貴電第八四二號ニ關シ

米側ニ於テハ豫テヨリノ主張竝ニ我方ノ要求ニ依リ關係國タル蘭トモ協議中ナル折柄本月二十四日「ホワイト。ハウス」發表ノ如ク米國ハ在英國ノ蘭政府ト協定ナ上蘭領「ギアナ」保護進駐ヲ斷行シタルカ右發表ニ明記セル如ク同進駐ハ米國防資源トシテ必要ナル「アルミニウム」確保ヲ主眼トシ而モ平常時ナラハ蘭國政府ガ蘭印ノ兵力ヲ派遣スヘキ筈ナルモ西南太平洋ニ於ケル現在ノ情勢ノ下ニ之ヲ行フヲ得サルヲ以テ米國陸軍ヲ以テ同地ノ「アルミニウム」鑛山ヲ保護スルモノニシテ同時ニ蘭政府ノ招請ニ依リ伯利西爾モ之ニ參加セル次第ヲ明カニシ居ルニ鑑ミ又茲ニ蘭國外相ガ蘭印訪問ノ途次當地ニ立寄り米國政府當局ト協議セル以來米ノ對蘭印軍需品ノ供給及技師ノ米蘭印間ノ往來等ノ事實竝ニ蘭印ノ曆史ニモ徴シ日米交渉決裂ノ結果ニ伴フ情勢如何ニ依リテハ英米カ前記米伯ノ蘭領「ギアナ」進駐ノ如ク、蘭印ニ於ケル護謨、錫等ノ國防資源確保ヲ名トシテ之カ保護進駐ノ手段ニ出ツルコト

Def Doc No. 1401 Y-2

アリ得ヘキヲ考慮ニ入レ置クノ要アル次第ニシテ往電一一八〇號ニ此ノ點ニ
言及セルモ右ノ趣旨ニ他ナラス、 (了)